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INTRODUCTION: LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, THE
DISASTER CYCLE, AND THE FUKUSHIMA
ACCIDENT
DANIEL A. FARBER†
There is no gainsaying the importance of the subject of this
Symposium. Year after year, disasters exact a toll on our society. This
Symposium marks significant advances in our understanding of the
legal system’s role in managing disaster risks.
The figures are sobering. According to a nationwide database of
U.S. disaster losses, disaster costs have averaged twelve billion dollars
1
per year over the past half-century. From 1980 through 2004, the U.S.
experienced sixty-two weather events causing an average of a billion
2
dollars or more in damages. Averages, however, are misleading—
3
Hurricane Katrina alone caused about $100 billion in direct damage.
Losses are highly skewed, with the top twenty percent of the most
4
destructive events accounting for eighty percent of the damages.
These mega-disasters pose unique challenges to the legal system.
This Symposium reflects an increasing recognition of the role the
5
legal system plays in disaster prevention, response, and recovery.

† Dan Farber is the Sho Sato Professor of Law and chair of the Energy and Resources
Group at the University of California, Berkeley. He is also the Co-Director of the Center for
Law, Energy, and the Environment. Professor Farber serves on the editorial board of
Foundation Press, is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and is a Life
Member of the American Law Institute. In addition, he is the editor of Issues in Legal
Scholarship.
1. Carolyn Kousky, Informing Climate Adaptation: A Review of the Economic Costs of
Natural Disasters, Their Determinants, and Risk Reduction Options 14 (Res. for the Future
Discussion Paper No. 12-28, 2012). Kousky discusses the data and methodological issues
involved in such estimates in detail. Id. at 11–13.
2. JAMES F. MISKEL, DISASTER RESPONSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY: WHAT WORKS,
WHAT DOESN’T 25 (Stanford Security Studies 2008) (2006) (citing Nat’l Climatic Data Ctr.,
Billion Dollar Weather/Climate Disasters, NAT’L OCEANOGRAPHIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/reports/billionz.html#chron (last updated Apr. 24, 2012)).
3. Id. at 99.
4. Kousky, supra note 1, at 16.
5. For a discussion of these issues, see generally DANIEL A. FARBER, JIM CHEN, ROBERT
R.M. VERCHICK, & LISA GROW SUN, DISASTER LAW AND POLICY (2d ed. 2010).
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Since Hurricane Katrina, which revealed a disturbing lack of
preparation to handle disasters, a growing community of scholars has
focused on disaster law. This emerging legal field seeks to inform and
improve disaster-related decisionmaking, as evidenced by a spate of
6
recent books and a rapidly expanding number of law review articles
7
on the subject.
This Symposium features prominent examples of legal
scholarship’s ability to illuminate—and hopefully help to reform—the
network of legal rules and institutions that deals with disaster risks.
We can learn a great deal about the nature of this network and about
the significance of the Symposium contributions by considering the
events surrounding the Fukushima meltdown.
In this Introduction, I will put the Symposium articles in context
by setting them within the disaster cycle, as exemplified by the recent
Fukushima disaster. The disaster cycle provides a unifying framework
for disaster law. I will begin by explaining the disaster cycle and its
significance for understanding disaster policy. I will then go through
the major stages of the cycle, showing how the Symposium articles
help illuminate the situation facing Japan after the Fukushima
accident.
I. THE DISASTER CYCLE AS A UNIFYING FRAMEWORK
As shown by the following figure, the disaster cycle delineates a
set of strategies including mitigation, emergency response,
compensation, and rebuilding, with rebuilding completing the circle
8
by including (or failing to include) mitigation measures:

6. See, e.g., id.; ENVTL. LAW INST., LOSING GROUND: A NATION ON EDGE (John R.
Nolon & Daniel B. Rodriguez eds., 2007); ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, FACING CATASTROPHE:
ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION FOR A POST-KATRINA WORLD (2010); NAN D. HUNTER, THE LAW
OF EMERGENCIES: PUBLIC HEALTH AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT (2009).
7. We can get some sense of the expansion from a Westlaw search for ti(“flood
insurance” “levees” “oil spill” “forest fire” “natural disaster”). For 2000–2005, the search
produced 23 documents; for 2007–2012, the search produced 131 documents (search of JLR
database on Aug. 1, 2012). A search for “Hurricane Katrina” in the same database on August 1,
2012 produced 3997 documents, of which 128 had the term in their titles.
8. FARBER ET AL., supra note 5, at 3.
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Fig 1. The Cycle of Disaster Law.

Each stage of the circle of disaster—mitigation, emergency
response, insurance/liability compensation, rebuilding—is part of
society’s risk management portfolio. In the popular mind, the focus
may be on the drama of the disaster itself and the immediate
emergency response. But this focus can be quite misleading.
In reality, the emergency response is only one part of the risk
management portfolio. Each stage of the disaster cycle offers
opportunities to reduce the social costs of disasters. If we begin in the
lower corner of the figure, mitigation efforts attempt to lessen the
potential impact of disaster events before disaster strikes. Successes
and failures at this stage can spell the difference between a routine
disruption and a major catastrophe. As early as Rousseau, scholars
understood the connection between land-use decisions and disaster
10
impacts. The significance of the emergency response needs no
explanation. After the emergency has passed, insurance, tort law, and
government disaster assistance provide ways of spreading and shifting
risks. When we cannot (or simply do not) mitigate risks before the

9. Verchick’s version of this chart is similar but uses slightly different phrasing and omits
the event itself as a node. See Robert R.M. Verchick, Disaster Justice: The Geography of Human
Capability, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 23, 27 fig.1 (2012).
10. See Verchick, supra note 9, at 32 (discussing Rousseau’s letter to Voltaire which
argued, in part, that if the population of Lisbon had been more uniformly distributed when the
earthquake of 1755 struck, “the damage would have been much less”) (quoting Russell R.
Dynes, The Dialogue between Voltaire and Rousseau on the Lisbon Earthquake: The Emergence
of a Social Scientific View, 18 INT’L J. MASS EMERGENCIES & DISASTERS 97, 106 (2000)).
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event, or avoid them through swift response afterwards, these
compensation mechanisms can help blunt the impact and prepare for
reconstruction or rebuilding. Rebuilding has significance in its own
right, but in some sense it is also just the beginning of a new cycle—
inasmuch as it incorporates mitigation efforts for the next disaster
down the road.
The cycle would have limited interest if it merely represented a
chronology of unrelated events and actions. But complex interactions
and structures characterize both the disaster cycle and its
components. Risk mitigation involves a sub-cycle of interconnected
strategies, while disaster response involves careful institutional design
that takes place before the event, and recovery involves the interplay
between funding mechanisms (some private, some state or federal)
and local government efforts. Other fields of law may touch on parts
of the puzzle (e.g., state and local government law, insurance law,
land use law, tort law), but miss the larger picture that is incorporated
into the concept of the disaster cycle.
An advantage of using the disaster cycle as a framework is that
the emergency response, which usually gets the lions’ share of
attention, is put into context. Risk mitigation failures often contribute
to the impact of the later disaster, turning an otherwise manageable
event into a more serious risk to life or property, or amplifying what
would otherwise be a less significant risk to calamitous proportions.
Post-emergency compensation mechanisms and rebuilding are as
important as the emergency response in determining the severity of
the impact on many victims.
The disaster cycle is also important because no one stage can be
considered in isolation. For instance, the appropriate degree of risk
mitigation may depend on expectations about emergency response. If
project planners assume that a disaster will lead to successful
evacuation, they will downplay potential risks to life in their planning.
On the other hand, if disaster responders assume that risk mitigation
will be successful, they will make less of an investment in planning for
an emergency response, and the response will focus on those risks
that could not be effectively mitigated in advance. Similarly, if
insurance coverage is universal, project planners will not have to
consider risk aversion in choosing mitigation measures, and they may
find it less important to invest in preventing certain kinds of property
harm.
Finally, the disaster cycle is illuminating simply because the loop
is closed. It is always tempting to downplay the risk of future disasters
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after a disaster has taken place. For instance, we might like to believe
that the U.S. Gulf Coast will never be hit by another Katrina or BP
oil spill, or that Fukushima was a unique example of a severe natural
disaster impacting a nuclear power plant. But risks of this kind do not
disappear. Every disaster merely begins the cycle again, calling for a
new round of risk mitigation.
As we will see, the Fukushima disaster involved serious problems
at every stage of the cycle. The articles in this Symposium provide a
source of insight at each of these stages. I will begin with the issue of
risk mitigation before the event. The outlines of the disaster are
commonly known, but more details will be developed in the course of
discussing the emergency response. Proceeding clockwise through the
disaster cycle illustrated in the figure above, I will then briefly discuss
the compensation and insurance issues, and what we can foresee in
terms of rebuilding after Fukushima. At each stage, the Symposium
contributions are relevant, highlighting failures at Fukushima or
pointing toward future reforms.
II. RISK MITIGATION
The most effective emergency response is that which is never
needed because the emergency is forestalled. However well-executed
an emergency response might be, it is always better if there is no
emergency to respond to, or if a disaster is small rather than large. As
we will see, the Fukushima accident involved some serious lapses in
risk assessment and risk management, and the articles in the
Symposium help shed light on these issues.
The damage wrought by a natural event—extreme weather or
earthquakes, for example—is linked with human agency and
manipulation of the natural environment, both at the site of the
disaster itself and more generally due to anthropogenic climate
change. It is almost a cliché in the field that there is no such thing as a
truly natural disaster. Physical “phenomena are a necessary
component of risk, but they are only the starting point in addressing
safety concerns”—to be fully effective, the work of calculating and
planning for disaster risk must account for “acts of nature, . . .
11
weaknesses of human nature, and . . . side effects of technology.”
Therefore, the study of disaster must arguably begin with a definition
of the term “disaster” as an event with both natural and artificial

11. Daniel A. Farber, Robert G. Bea, Karlene Roberts, Edward Wenk & Kofi Inkabi,
Reinventing Flood Control, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1085, 1089–90 (2006).
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(human-induced) causes, or perhaps with solely artificial causes, as in
the case of terrorism events.
The Fukushima accident is a prime example of how risk
mitigation failures and natural events interact with horrendous
results. During the Fukushima nuclear crisis, government officials and
industry representatives said that the tsunami that struck the reactors
was beyond imagination, thus excusing their failure to consider such a
12
risk in the planning process. As it turns out, there actually had been
warnings about the possibility of a tsunami of this magnitude, but the
13
warnings were ignored.
The reactors were situated on a small bluff, which was thought to
14
provide sufficient protection from tsunamis. History indicated
otherwise. There is a historical record of a huge tsunami in July of 869
15
and geological evidence indicating a thousand-year return cycle.
Indeed, in 2008, experts at TEPCO (the Tokyo Electric Power
Company) had performed some preliminary modeling suggesting that
16
the tsunami hazard was much greater than its previous estimate.
Until 2006, the government did not even discuss tsunamis in its safety
guidelines, and even then it insisted that the “robust sealed
containment structure around the reactor itself would prevent any
damage to the nuclear part of the reactor from a tsunami . . . No
17
radiological hazard would be likely.”
This confidence in seismological safety would have been hard to
support even when the statement was made, but within a year it
would be definitively rebutted. On July 16, 2007, an earthquake
damaged the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant. The
designers had used the historical record and added a margin of
safety—but still reached only forty percent of the actual quake

12. Rodney C. Ewing & Jeroen Ritsema, Underestimating Nuclear Accident Risks: Why
Are Rare Events So Common?, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (May 3, 2011),
http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/roundtables/fukushima-what-dont-we-know.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. James M. Acton & Mark Hibbs, Why Fukushima was Preventable, THE CARNEGIE
PAPERS, Mar. 2012, at 1, 13 (citing Jin Nishikawa & Eisuke Sasaki, TEPCO Warned of Big
Tsunami 4 Days Prior to March 11, THE ASAHI SHIMBUN: ASIA & JAPAN WATCH (Aug. 25,
2011), http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/quake_tsunami/AJ201108257639), available at
http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/03/06/why-fukushima-was-preventable.
17. Charles Perrow, Fukushima, Risk, and Probability: Expect the Unexpected, BULL.
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (Apr. 2011), http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/fukushima-riskand-probability-expect-the-unexpected.
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18

strength. Apparently, what they thought were three small faults
19
were actually part of one large fault. The accident also involved
unforeseen mechanisms of harm. One company official said, “It was
beyond our imagination that a space could be made in the hole on the
20
outer wall for the electric cables.” This event should have been a
warning about the unreliability of seismic predictions, the potential
for unprecedented harm mechanisms, and the need to widen
“imagination” beyond the comfort zone of well-documented risks.
Yet officials and industry continued as if they had a full
understanding of all the risks, rather than realizing the need for
additional precaution.
Some investigators reported that the earthquake, even without
the supposedly unexpected tsunami, had been enough to trigger fuel
21
meltdowns at Fukushima. Whether the cause was the earthquake
itself or the subsequent tsunami, company and government officials
were surely on notice of the dangers of overconfidence and the
potential for severe events outside of recent historical experience.
Flaws in the regulatory structure may have further fostered the
officials’ complacency before Fukushima. Critics point to the
“extremely fragmented” nature of the Japanese nuclear regulatory
22
system. They also point to the “close rapport between officials and
industry”—as exemplified by the fact that “thirteen former highranking bureaucrats were members of the boards of directors in the
23
power companies.” The head of the regulatory commission held a
university chair endowed by TEPCO and may have received research
24
grants from the company.
The cozy relationship between the industry and regulators may
have contributed to complacency and overconfidence about the
future and the corresponding failure to anticipate the severity of
future disaster risks. But these problems are far from being unique to

18. Ashwin Kumar & M.V. Ramana, Nuclear Safety Lessons from Japan’s Summer
Earthquake, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (Dec. 4, 2007), http://www.thebulletin.org/webedition/features/nuclear-safety-lessons-japans-summer-earthquake.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Verchick, supra note 9, at 37.
22. Akira Nakamura & Masao Kikuchi, What We Know, and What We Have Not Yet
Learned: Triple Disasters and the Fukushima Nuclear Fiasco in Japan, 71 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
893, 897 (2011).
23. Id.
24. Id.
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Fukushima or to Japanese regulators. We can readily find examples
closer to home.
In his contribution to this Symposium, Dan Tarlock points to a
similar failure of risk assessment in terms of U.S. flood control policy
and law. He argues that U.S. flood policies are out of sync with
climate change, which will amplify future risks outside of historic
25
patterns. Among other reforms, he seconds the EU Flood
Directive’s call for scenario planning, including consideration of lowprobability extreme events, medium-probability events, and routine
26
events.
When a disaster proves that risk assessments and mitigation
methods were inadequate, reforms such as those that Tarlock
recommends would seem necessary. Again, Fukushima is an apt
example. Regulatory failure was part of the Fukushima story. Experts
point to a “growing body of evidence that suggests the accident was
the result of failures in regulation and nuclear plant design and that
both were lagging behind international best practices and
27
standards.” Not surprisingly, following the Fukushima accident,
“there has been much more extensive domestic and international
28
criticism of the Japanese regulatory system.” But whether real
reform will result is unclear.
The political dynamics of post-disaster reform efforts can be
complex. The Symposium article by Tom McGarity and Rena
Steinzor examines the dynamics of post-disaster reform in the context
29
of the contemporary United States. They focus on a case study of
coal ash retention ponds and a 2008 disaster in Tennessee. Calling the
Tennessee event a “preventable disaster,” they explore the
catastrophe, EPA’s failure to anticipate and prevent it, and EPA’s
30
tepid response to it. We will return to this issue in Part IV. But first
we need to consider the intermediate portions of the disaster cycle,
beginning with the emergency response.

25. A. Dan Tarlock, United States Flood Control Policy: The Incomplete Transition from
the Illusion of Total Protection to Risk Management, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 151, 171–76
(2012).
26. Id.
27. Acton & Hibbs, supra note 16, at 3.
28. Id. at 24.
29. See generally Thomas O. McGarity & Rena I. Steinzor, The End Game of
Deregulation: Myopic Risk Management and the Next Catastrophe, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
F. 93 (2012).
30. Id.
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III. THE DISASTER AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASES
Center stage in a disaster story is always taken by the event itself
and the emergency response. This section opens with a description of
the Fukushima disaster and response. Although officials undoubtedly
tried to do as well as they could under extremely difficult
circumstances, the response fell short in key respects. We will
consider some of the specific issues relating to the emergency
response that are illuminated by articles in the Symposium.
A. The Unfolding Fukushima Disaster and Emergency Response
We begin with the natural disaster preceding the reactor failures.
On March 11, 2011, in an event that is now known in Japan as 3/11, a
9.0 magnitude earthquake struck off the east coast of Japan, about
one-hundred miles east-northeast of Fukushima and two-hundred
31
miles northeast of Tokyo. The earthquake triggered a large tsunami
32
that overwhelmed seawalls and contributed to massive destruction.
As a direct result of the earthquake and tsunami, over 15,000 people
33
were killed and 340,000 were displaced. The tsunami and earthquake
struck quickly, but other portions of the disaster were only beginning
to unfold.
During the earthquake, the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power
station lost outside power—the station no longer had a connection to
the electrical grid. Backup diesel generators came on to supply the
missing power needed to maintain the cooling system. The Dai-ni
34
plant did not lose power but did face degraded safety systems.
About forty-six minutes after the quake, the first waves of an
35
enormous tsunami reached the Fukushima Dai-ichi power station.
The tsunami measured about forty-five feet high at the Dai-ichi

31. Magnitude 9.0 – Near the East Coast of Honshu, Japan, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY
(Mar. 11, 2011, 05:46:24 UTC), http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2011/
usc0001xgp/.
32. Norimitsu Onishi, Seawalls Offered Little Protection Against Tsunami’s Crushing
Waves, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2011, at A8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/14
/world/asia/14seawalls.html?pagewanted=all&_moc.semityn.
33. Katherine Harmon, Japan’s Post-Fukushima Earthquake Health Woes Go Beyond
Radiation Effects, SCI. AM., Mar. 2, 2012, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=
japans-post-fukushima-earthquake-health-woes-beyond-radiation
34. INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, MISSION REPORT: THE GREAT EAST JAPAN
EARTHQUAKE EXPERT MISSION 20 (2011), available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/
Meetings/PDFplus/2011/cn200/documentation/cn200_Final-Fukushima-Mission_Report.pdf.
35. Id.
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36

power station. This four-story high wall of water overwhelmed the
37
eighteen-foot seawall and knocked out emergency generators. An
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report provides a vivid
sense of the post-tsunami state of the nuclear plant, detailing how the
tsunami “caused widespread destruction of many buildings, doors,
38
roads, tanks and other site infrastructure.”
At that point, the emergency response phase began. According
to the IAEA, the “operators were faced with a catastrophic,
unprecedented emergency scenario with no power, reactor control or
instrumentation, and in addition, severely affected communications
39
systems both within and external to the site.” As a result, the reactor
operators had to struggle “in darkness with almost no
instrumentation and control systems to secure the safety of six
reactors, six nuclear fuel pools, a common fuel pool and dry cask
40
storage facilities.”
The severity of the earthquake and tsunami would have
41
challenged any response system. Perhaps understandably, the
response to the disaster was confused and disorganized. For instance,
a utility employee missed the fact that a key valve in Unit 1’s backup
cooling unit was closed, thinking instead that the absence of steam
42
meant there was no cooling water. Consequently, the cooling system
43
was shut down for three hours. Confusion also existed at much
higher levels of responsibility. Since “there was no comprehensive
disaster-management plan,” the prime minister “had to improvise,
44
which often involved yelling at regulators and Tepco executives.”

36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 12. The operators suffered under great handicaps in responding to the crisis:
The extreme difficulties that the operators on the site had to face in Fukushima
Dai-ichi have to be once again strongly underlined: loss of all the safety systems,
loss of practically all the instrumentation, necessity to cope with simultaneous
severe accidents on four plants, lack of human resources, lack of equipment, lack
of light in the installations, and general conditions of the installation after the
tsunami and after damage of the fuel resulted in hydrogen explosions and high
levels of radiation.
Id. at 43.
39. Id. at 12.
40. Id. at 40.
41. THE AM. NUCLEAR SOC’Y SPECIAL COMM. ON FUKUSHIMA, FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI
(2012).
42. Yoichi Funabashi & Kay Kitazawa, Fukushima in Review: A Complex Disaster, A
Disastrous Response, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 2012, at 9, 11.
43. Id.
44. Japan After the 3/11 Disaster, The Death of Trust, ECONOMIST, Mar. 10, 2012, at 35, 38.
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The crisis rapidly worsened. The offsite emergency control
center was inoperable because of earthquake and tsunami damage as
45
well as a lack of protections such as air-purification. Explosions
occurred at Units 1 through 4; the explosions at Units 1 through 3
were caused by a build-up of hydrogen while the cause for the
46
explosion at Unit 4 still remains unclear. Because it was at a slightly
higher elevation and was air-cooled (so it did not need cooling
47
water), diesel generators at Unit 6 remained functional in the
aftermath of the tsunami, and workers were able to use the power to
48
achieve a cold shutdown at Units 5 and 6. Emergency Situations
were declared for both the Fukushima Dai-ichi and Fukushima Dai-ni
49
power stations, resulting in evacuations and emergency measures.
With the evacuation and emergency measures, a new set of issues
took the forefront. These issues related to the relationship between
the officials managing the emergency and the public—first, the
officials’ efforts to manage the public response, and second, the
officials’ failure to adequately provide for the special needs of
portions of disadvantaged groups. These issues are discussed in the
next two subsections.
B. Managing the Public Response
As the evacuation measures illustrate, emergency responses
involve not only physical and technological measures, but also
management of the public’s behavior. Those responses are partly
shaped by expectations about public behavior—expectations that are
often distorted.
These distortions are the subject of Lisa Sun’s Symposium article
50
about disaster myths and the process that perpetuates these myths.
As she points out,

45. Id.
46. THE AM. NUCLEAR SOC’Y SPECIAL COMM. ON FUKUSHIMA, supra note 41, at 11-12.
47. Id. at 10.
48. Id. Cold shutdown is achieved after several days once the reactor is no longer critical
(temperatures below 200° F)—even after the cooling rods are inserted and fission stops, the
radioactive products continue to generate significant heat.
49. For the May 17 update of the TEPCO Roadmap towards Restoration, see Current
Status of Roadmap, TOKYO ELECTRIC POWER CO., http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corpcom/release/betu11_e/images/110517e3.pdf.
50. Lisa Grow Sun, Disaster Mythology and Availability Cascades, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y F. 73, 74 (2012).
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[D]isaster sociologists [have] identified several important
public misconceptions about typical human behavior in the
aftermath of disasters. These misconceptions—also called
“disaster myths”—include (1) the myth that widespread
antisocial behavior, such as violence and looting, is common
after disasters; (2) the myth that most disaster survivors will
panic and engage in irrational flight behavior; and (3) the
myth that disaster survivors commonly suffer a shock
reaction that paralyzes them and interferes with their ability
to respond to the disaster and care for themselves and
51
others.
These disaster myths distorted responses during the Fukushima
crisis and led to a lack of transparency that, in the end, only created
distrust.
During the Fukushima event, TEPCO “played down the extent
of the calamity, and initial reports avoided using the term
52
‘meltdown,’” that phrase surfaced only much later. Information
53
about radioactivity was “partly held back to avoid causing panic.”
For a couple of days after the accident, the officials were “driven by a
fear that public disclosures of radiation levels would cause
54
widespread panic.” Unfortunately, this tactic backfired. “Lacking
real information from the Japanese government, the media quickly
focused on Chernobyl as a convenient comparison for predicting
55
fallout deposition and radiation health effects.” Ironically, when
TEPCO did release information five days after the accident, it was
alarmist and inaccurate. Consequently, “[w]hat little confidence that
the international community and media had in reports coming from
56
the Japanese authorities evaporated, and speculation ran rampant.”
Even before the accident, fear of public response was a problem
in emergency planning. In order to avoid causing “unnecessary
anxiety and misunderstanding,” a drill involving an earthquake and
nuclear accident was cancelled, and instead the prefecture held an
57
emergency drill for heavy snow.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 74–75 (internal citations omitted).
Nakamura & Kakuchi, supra note 22, at 897.
Japan after the 3/11 Disaster, supra note 44.
Funabashi & Kitazawa, supra note 43, at 18.
THE AM. NUCLEAR SOC’Y SPECIAL COMM. ON FUKUSHIMA, supra note 41, at 31.
Id.
Funabashi & Kitazawa, supra note 43, at 14.
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These efforts to submerge information about risks ultimately
backfired and led to more public distrust. Professor Sun suggests
some avenues for reducing the influence of disaster myths, such as the
spread of disaster mythology. This influence can perhaps be mitigated
by changing the incentives of “availability entrepreneurs” who might
otherwise perpetuate the myth. Options include hiring more educated
emergency managers to advise local officials in disaster
decisionmaking and creating targeted public information
58
campaigns—particularly campaigns aimed at young people.
Sun’s specific proposals are aimed at the special problems posed
by the myth of post-disaster crime. For instance, involving more
educated emergency managers in decisionmaking would help reduce
the fear of panic among decisionmakers. In addition to Sun’s
proposals, it might also be worth considering changing the incentives
of decisionmakers by creating liability against them individually or
against the government generally for failing to reveal reliable
information during the course of the response.
C. Disaggregating the Public
Planning for emergency response requires particular attention to
the needs of vulnerable populations. Poverty, old age, and disability
can heighten an individual’s vulnerability to catastrophic loss. In the
case of Fukushima, sixty-five percent of the deaths involved
59
individuals who were over sixty years old. Such individuals often
possess limited or no access to the economic and social resources
necessary for self-care and self-rescue during a disaster—often
necessary when the government’s own resources are overtaxed,
disorganized, or insufficient—and thereby are much more likely to
60
suffer during a disaster.

58. Sun, supra note 50, at 81–92.
59. Verchick, supra note 9, at 24.
60. Cf. David D. Caron, Catastrophes Afflict Poor the Most, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 5, 2005, at
B9. As Hurricane Katrina demonstrated, when economically and socially disadvantaged
communities are largely composed of people of color, the disaster’s results take on even more
epic proportions —because racial minority status and limited resources often go hand-in-hand,
and because of the chilling effects of entrenched racism on disaster response and management.
See Nils Gilman, What Katrina Teaches about the Meaning of Racism, June 11, 2006,
http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Gilman; Christopher Edley, Jr., The New American
Dilemma: Racial Profiling Post-9/11, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN
AGE OF TERRORISM 170 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., 2003).
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In his Symposium contribution, Rob Verchick argues that we
61
need to think about “disaster” and “justice” in new ways. The social
science research encourages us to think of disasters as part of the
underlying social mechanism. Verchick provides a detailed review of
some of the most important geographic studies of disaster and social
vulnerability and discusses Susan Cutter’s innovative mapping
62
techniques. He observes that Amartya Sen’s capability approach to
evaluating human welfare suggests the need to understand disaster
risk in terms of real-life social vulnerabilities, which helps determine
the capabilities that individuals have to respond to and recover from
disasters. Verchick recommends legal changes that follow from this
insight, including a proposal for a nationwide vulnerability mapping
63
system and a Disaster Justice Executive Order.
Disparate disaster impacts of the kind that Verchick discusses
were present at Fukushima. The impacts of the Fukushima disaster
were severe. The radiation risk is difficult to assess, but exposure
could ultimately lead to anywhere from 15 to 1300 deaths, in addition
64
to the roughly 600 deaths caused by the evacuation itself. These
harms do not fall equally on all parts of the population. The
evacuation deaths were predominantly caused by fatigue and
65
exposure among elderly or chronically ill evacuees.
Physicians report that bedridden patients were hastily evacuated
in police cars; many patients had to wait more than twenty-four hours
before reaching medical facilities, often without heaters in Japan’s

61. Verchick, supra note 9.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 68–71.
64. Max McClure, Stanford Researchers Calculate Global Health Impacts of the Fukushima
Nuclear Disaster, STAN. U. (July 17, 2012), http://news.stanford.edu/news/2012/july/fukushimahealth-impacts-071712.html. The evacuation was extensive:
The central government decreed two concentric crescent-shaped zones: a
mandatory evacuation zone and an “evacuation preparation zone.” Within the
half-moon-shaped inner crescent twenty kilometers (twelve miles) from the
reactors, no one is allowed to live or visit without special permission until the
government lifts the edict. About 10,500 residents were ejected from their homes
and businesses in this “no-go” evacuation zone. In the outer crescent twenty to
thirty kilometers (twelve to nineteen miles) from the meltdown, a swath affecting
almost 60,000 people, residents were told to prepare for evacuation in case of
emergency and to stay indoors as much as possible.
Robert B. Leflar, Ayako Hirata, Masayuki Murayama, & Shozo Ota, Human Flotsam, Legal
Fallout: Japan’s Tsunami and Nuclear Meltdown, 27 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 107, 110 (2012)
(footnotes omitted).
65. McClure, supra note 64.

Farber (Do Not Delete)

1/7/2013 7:59 PM

Fall 2012]

INTRODUCTION

15

66

chilly March weather. The physicians’ recommendation for special
67
evacuation plans of hospital inpatients and the elderly resonates
with Verchick’s call for special attention to vulnerable populations.
The mapping techniques discussed by Verchick could also be
invaluable in emergency planning for vulnerable populations in future
Fukushima-like situations.
Although discrimination against the elderly receives occasional
attention from our society, their needs have a lower profile among
academics and activists than other vulnerable groups. One reason, at
least in the United States, may be that our social safety net for the
elderly is relatively strong, given the existence of Social Security and
Medicare. But in disaster situations, the elderly “are often at higher
68
risk” and clearly require attention as a disadvantaged group. The
evacuation deaths at Fukushima exemplified this general trend.
Disaster
response
necessarily
involves
on-the-ground
improvisation to deal with unforeseen problems. Nevertheless, the
law also plays a role in setting the stage for the emergency response.
As illustrated by Verchick’s article, the legal system can help ensure
appropriate organization, planning, and resources. Moreover, Sun’s
article shows how the disaster response is marred by persistent
errors—errors that the legal system can help reduce. Thus, although
at first sight emergency response might seem like an area beyond the
control of the legal system, legal scholarship has a clear capacity to
help guide reforms.
IV. AFTER THE DISASTER: COMPENSATION, INSURANCE, AND
RECONSTRUCTION
No system of risk mitigation or disaster response can prevent all
harm. Recovery from disaster requires funding to reconstruct,
relocate, and otherwise respond to disaster impacts. This section will
discuss compensation systems and the problems posed by postdisaster reconstruction, including efforts to improve risk mitigation
before the next disaster.

66. Koichi Tanigawa, Yoshio Hosoi, Nobuyuki Hirohashi, Yasumasa Iwasaki & Kenji
Kamiya, Loss of Life After Evacuation: Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Accident, 379
LANCET 889, 890 (2012).
67. Id. at 890–91.
68. Verchick, supra note 9, at 45.
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A. Compensation Issues
Post-disaster compensation to disaster victims generally takes
one of three forms: private insurance, government aid, or the tort
69
system. The first method of compensation is private insurance;
however, private insurance is often unavailable or fails to provide
prompt and efficient compensation. Significant hurdles are created by
the frequent unavailability of separate private insurance for
catastrophic risks, the exclusion of catastrophic risks from insurance
coverage, and the difficulty of handling very large numbers of claims.
The second method of compensation, litigation against responsible
private parties, also has its limitations. These limitations include the
need for proof of negligence or other bases for liability and limits on
the financial assets and insurance coverage of potential defendants,
along with other judicial doctrines limiting recovery. Third is the
possibility of obtaining compensation from the government through
various routes. These possibilities include tort claims against federal
or state government for negligence (subject to immunity defenses),
claims under special compensation schemes for particular disasters,
and claims based on constitutional provisions requiring compensation
70
for the taking (or in some states, damaging) of property. In the
United States, at least, it is a mistake to speak of a “system” of
compensation for catastrophic losses. Instead, our society has a
makeshift assembly of jerry-rigged components, including insurance,
tort liability, and direct government assistance.
In their Symposium contribution, Véronique Bruggeman,
Michael Faure, and Tobias Heldt argue that government can play a
role in stimulating the insurability of catastrophic risks. The authors
present arguments in favor of an active government role in
compensation, either by acting as a primary insurer or as reinsurer of
71
last resort. Of course, they point out, such an active role should not

69. For a detailed discussion of these issues in a multi-national comparison, see Robert L.
Rabin & Suzanne A. Bratis, United States, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF
CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 303, 356 (Michael Faure & Ton Hartlief eds.,
2006). The remainder of the paragraph in the text presents some of their findings.
70. Liability and government-supported insurance can also be combined. See W. Kip
Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Deterring and Compensating Oil-Spill Catastrophes: The Need
for Strict and Two-Tier Liability, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1717 (2011) (suggesting a combination of
private liability and tax-supported compensation for damages that exceed the defendant’s
financial capacity).
71. Véronique Bruggeman, Michael Faure & Tobias Heldt, Insurance Against Catastrophe:
Government Stimulation of Insurance Markets for Catastrophic Events, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y F 185, 186 (2012).
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serve to relieve injurers of liability in cases of technological accidents,
since providing immunity would be an indirect subsidy to the risky
72
activity. Thus, their article seems to point toward a dual system in
which the government fosters compensation after the liable party’s
ability to compensate is exhausted, either by providing direct financial
support or by providing reinsurance or other support for private
73
insurance.
Fukushima provides an apt example of the compensation
problem. In theory, the operator of a Japanese nuclear power plant is
74
strictly liable for harm, with no liability cap. But the reality may be
different. The government has been afraid to let TEPCO go
75
bankrupt, preferring a bailout that protects shareholders. Of course,
this weakens the incentive effect of liability to induce care. In
addition, the Japanese tort system is not geared toward producing
prompt, full compensation. Obtaining compensation may require
often-lengthy recourse to administrative or political processes. For
instance, numerous victims of Minamata disease, which is caused by
methyl-mercury poisoning, began an effort to obtain compensation in
1957, but did not receive a judicial ruling until 1973, resulting in an
76
administrative compensation system that functioned poorly.
77
Litigation was still pending as of 2009.
To expedite settlement in the Fukushima setting, the government
has established a Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear
78
Damage (DRC). The DRC is off to a slow start.

72. Id. at 207.
73. For a similar proposal in the context of oil spills, see Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note
70, at 1722–24.
74. See X. Vásquez-Maignan, Fukushima: Liability and Compensation, 29.2 NEA NEWS 9,
9 (2011) (noting that in the Japanese system, the owner of the plant where a nuclear disaster
occurs is strictly liable for the resulting harm). There is an exception for a “grave natural
disaster of an exceptional character,” meaning a “huge natural disaster beyond all expectations
of humankind.” Taro Hokugo, Nuclear Liability System of Japan in Relation to the Accident at
Fukushima Nuclear Power Plants 4 (Feb. 6, 2012), www.aec.gov.tw/www/fukushima/files
/index_15_06.pdf. However, the government takes the position that the exception does not
apply to Fukushima. Id.
75. See Hatsuru Morita, Rescuing Victims and Rescuing TEPCO: A Legal and Political
Analysis of the TEPCO Bailout 7–8 (March 21, 2012) (working paper), available at
www.ssrn.com/abstract=2026868.
76.
Eri Osaka, Reevaluating the Role of the Tort Liability System in Japan, 26 ARIZ. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 393, 403–07, 412 (2009).
77. Id.
78. Vásquez-Maignan, supra note 74, at 9.
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The alternative dispute resolution (ADR) process was launched
in September 2011. As of February 2012, however, few cases have
been resolved through ADR. Issues that will inevitably arise in court,
such as the extent to which cases will be tried individually or through
mass litigation, remain to be resolved. Judicial and administrative
79
precedents provide no clear answers. In addition, there are questions
80
about the amount of compensation for victims.
Legal resources are also quite limited. Fukushima Prefecture has
a population of two million, but has “only 155 attorneys and 284 shihō
81
shoshi (quasi-lawyers with limited law licenses).” Yet local bar
associations have shown some resistance to efforts by foreign lawyers
82
to offer services. Moreover, there is considerable doubt among
victims about whether TEPCO will ultimately have the assets to pay
83
more than a fraction of their claims.
After compensation, the next step in the disaster cycle is
reconstruction. In the Fukushima context, reconstruction involves
decontamination. This, in itself, is a huge task. Tracking the
84
radioactive contamination is a first step. At least a thousand square
kilometers of land will be cleaned up, requiring disposal of fifteen to
85
thirty-one million cubic meters of contaminated soil and debris. By

79. Leflar et al., supra note 64, at 118 (footnote omitted)
80. Leflar et al. discuss the uneven start of compensation provided by TEPCO:
TEPCO initially responded by providing a first round of partial provisional
compensation payments to residents displaced by government orders from the
“no-go” inner crescent: ¥1 million (US$12,500) for households and ¥750,000
(US$9400) for individuals. The compensation amount was recommended by the
national government and paid by TEPCO. Businesses were eligible for
compensation for half their demonstrated losses up to ¥2.5 million (US$31,000)
upon submission of documentation. A second round of further compensation
payments was announced August 4, 2011.
Id. at 112–13 (footnotes omitted). As one local observer said about the compensation for
business losses, “[t]here’s nothing you can do but laugh. How can business people who have lost
everything get going again with that?” Id. at 122.
81. Id. at 115 (footnote omitted).
82. Id. at 118.
83. Community leaders in Minami Soma articulated their concerns:
“The question is, when we get past these partial payments and it comes time for
TEPCO to pay the full amount of damages they owe, what kind of financial shape
will TEPCO be in, and how much of what they owe will they be able to pay? A
fifth? A tenth?
Id. at 120.
84. For a discussion of the efforts taken to track radioactive fallout, see generally Naohiro
Yoshida & Jota Kanda, Tracking the Fukushima Radionuclides, 336 SCI. 1115 (2012).
85. Winifred Bird, As Fukushima Cleanup Begins, Long-term Impacts are Weighted, YALE
ENVT. 360 (Jan. 9, 2012), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/as_fukushima_cleanup_begins_longterm_impacts_are_weighed/2482/.
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February 2012, the Japanese government had begun to distribute
86
thirteen billion dollars in contracts. We can hope for the best in the
rebuilding process. But rebuilding will be for naught unless better risk
mitigation measures are in place against future disasters.
B. Post-Disaster Mitigation Reforms
Often, regulatory measures are strengthened from post-disaster
response. This process has been an important factor in shaping U.S.
environmental law. But the process may no longer be functioning
effectively. Tom McGarity and Rena Steinzor attempt to explain why
disasters like the Kingston spill, the BP Horizon spill, and the Upper
Big Branch coal mine disaster no longer appear to stimulate Congress
and EPA to initiate the sort of immediate governmental response that
past disasters generated (such as the Exxon Valdez spill and the
87
Bhopal toxic release).
McGarity and Steinzor attribute this shortfall in the disaster
response to political polarization, industry dominance of the
88
legislative process, and distrust of government. As an antidote to this
toxic political brew, they recommend shifting authority from White
House and Congressional overseers back to line agencies, such as the
EPA. In addition, they recommend making a focus on corporate
accountability central to a new narrative about the role of
89
government. It appears to an outside observer that the Japanese
political system, too, suffers from its own maladies.
Suggesting cures for these political woes is far beyond the scope
of this Introduction. Nevertheless, at the risk of merely restating the
obvious, it is worth observing that disasters are teachable moments
which can help build better understanding even if they do not result
in immediate reforms. They can shed a harsh light on regulatory
failures and political dysfunctions leading up to disasters. They can
often highlight the need for corporate accountability that McGarity
and Steinzor herald.
As academics, part of our jobs should be to objectively document
the failures that lead to disasters or amplify harm. We should not
shrink from proposing solutions, even if the political system may not
86. Hiroko Tabuchi, A Confused Nuclear Cleanup, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2012), at B1,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/11/business/global/after-fukushima-disaster-a-confused-effortat-cleanup.html?pagewanted=all&_moc.semityn.
87. McGarity & Steinzor, supra note 29, at 137–38.
88. Id. at 145.
89. Id. at 147.

Farber (Do Not Delete)

20

1/7/2013 7:59 PM

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

[Vol. 23:1

be ready to adopt all of them. Finally, whatever work we do to
improve systems of disaster response and recovery can pay a dividend
in terms of civic education by showing that government can indeed
effectively and efficiently assist people when they need help the most.
A better appreciation of the government’s ability to deliver vital
services in the aftermath of disasters may indirectly help build
confidence in the government’s ability to mitigate risks in advance.
V. CONCLUSION
Appropriate legal structures can ensure that disasters are
anticipated and contained in a comprehensive and equitable manner.
Disaster law is a complex, multi-faceted, and rapidly expanding body
of thought, one that addresses the dire need for a systematic,
thoughtful approach to managing the chaos of disasters. This
Symposium makes a notable contribution to that intellectual
enterprise.
Disasters, both natural and human-induced, are an increasingly
common feature of twenty-first century life. Yet, despite some
improvements, the legal system remains gravely unprepared for the
next major disaster—the occurrence of which is nothing short of a
certainty in a world characterized by global warming and complex,
dangerous technologies. It is therefore incumbent upon legal scholars
to undertake an intensive effort to examine and reform the
interlocking structures of governance and regulation that pertain to
disasters. The Symposium editors have assembled a remarkable
group of articles in this vein.
Legal scholarship, such as the articles in this Symposium, is
beginning to develop a coherent intellectual map of disaster issues
that will guide the near- and long-term future of disaster law
scholarship and dialogue. Over time, scholars will further refine and
explore the wide variety of avenues for research within the field and
will continue to influence disaster prevention, response, and
management policy for the better.
As we have seen, many of the shortcomings in current disaster
law have surfaced in the Fukushima context. Throughout the cycle of
disaster, the Japanese legal system has struggled to control risks,
respond when risks materialize, and provide the financial basis for
reconstruction. Some of the issues relate specifically to Japanese
society, but the general problems seem to be universal. Whether
Japanese or not, we can learn about the needs of our own societies
from the events in Japan.
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Scholarship such as this Symposium can shed light on these
problems and suggest possible cures. We can only hope that society,
in Japan and elsewhere, uses this teachable moment well, to become
better prepared for the future.

